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ABSTRACT

the software, the people who will eventually use the software, and
the “penumbra,” people who will be affected by the use of the
software. (We use the term “penumbra” to indicate that these
people “are under the shadow” of the software; they may or may
not even be aware of the software, but it affects them nonetheless
[4].) These groups can intersect, but each group represents
different collections of interests. In this paper we will focus on
three relationships among these groups that we think are most
important to the issue of software reliability: the relationships
between developers and their employers, between developers and
users, and between developers and the penumbra.

Engineering requires tradeoffs [23]. When engineering computer
applications, software engineers should consider the costs and
benefits to humans as an integral part of the software development
process. In this paper we focus on reliability, a central aspect of
software quality, and the influence of relationships and various
software development contexts on the software developer.

Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.7.4 [The Computing Profession]: Professional Ethics – codes
of good practice.

Others have analyzed different influences and incentives that can
affect the software development process with respect to software
reliability [8] and described legal considerations as well [11]. In
this paper we discuss relationships that impact professional
responsibilities. As we will see, these professional responsibilities
are also greatly influenced by the software development context.
Regardless, we insist that professional responsibilities to enhance
software reliability extend beyond the letter of the law.

General Terms
Management, Economics, Reliability, Human Factors.

Keywords
Professional responsibility, software development tradeoffs.

1. INTRODUCTION
A software engineer is required to constantly negotiate tradeoffs
when developing a computer application, and software reliability
concerns are significant during that process. The IEEE defines
reliability as “the ability of a system or component to perform its
required functions under stated conditions for a specified period
of time” [9]. At each step of software development, decisions are
made about functionality, the conditions under which the software
will be allowed to operate, and how much time and money will be
invested in trying to achieve and assess a particular level of
reliability.

2. HOW RELATIONSHIPS IMPACT
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING
RELIABILITY
A central reality of software development is that perfection is not
an achievable goal [4]. While there may be an occasional
opportunity for a piece of software to approach perfection, more
often than not, the “good-fast-cheap, pick two” [19] engineering
tradeoff is unavoidable. Note that “good” includes many qualities
and that reliability is one quality that we understand reasonably
(but not perfectly) well. Furthermore, as noted by Lyu, software
reliability is a key factor in software quality [14]. Thus, as we
discuss “good/fast/cheap” tradeoffs, we will focus on reliability
even though the arguments could be made in a similar fashion
about other aspects of quality.

We contend that competent engineering requires that human
values be an explicit and central concern in the process of
software development. The people to be considered include the
developers themselves, their employers, the people who will buy

Various people have different power in making decisions and
different stakes in the results. The developers and their employers
are driven by the unique realities of the software market. At least
in part because market-share is particularly important in software,
software developers are delivering software faster and faster [6].
“Fast” and “cheap” are particularly important for the developer’s
employer. The “good” of software reliability is in tension with
“fast and cheap”. In the long run, poor reliability may be a
disadvantage for a software provider, but that concern may move
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the ACM and the IEEE Computer Society, has as its first
principle: “Software engineers shall act consistently with the
public interest” [22]. The Code goes on to explain that “(t)he
ultimate effect of the work should be to the public good”. The
Association of Information Technology Professionals Code of
Ethics has a similar clause that requires that their members
acknowledge a professional obligation to society [2]. We contend
that this emphasis on the public good requires that the
good/fast/cheap-tradeoffs pay special attention to “good,” since
software quality affects the public most directly. This emphasis
on quality includes an emphasis on software reliability.

to the background in the rush to deliver a feature-rich application
before the release of a competitor’s product.
Software users and software buyers want good software; they do
not want to pay more than they have to, and they want it as
quickly as possible. However, different users emphasize different
combinations of good/fast/cheap. Individual users may be more
price conscious than a large corporation. Users buying software
that is life critical (for use in a pace-maker or aircraft control, for
example) will tend to emphasize reliability, and users buying
computer games may emphasize “fast”, also wanting the latest
and greatest features.

Deborah Johnson analyzes the relationship between computing
professionals and their customers using three models based on
where the decision-making primarily resides: agency,
paternalistic, and fiduciary [10]. In the agency model, the
computing professional does what the customer requests;
decision-making resides primarily with the customer. In the
paternalistic model, the computing professional decides what the
customer needs; decision-making resides primarily with the
professional. In the fiduciary model, decisions are made
collaboratively; ideally, decision-making is shared between the
professional and the customer, each contributing appropriate
information and judgment.

The people who may be most affected by the software may be the
least aware of the software. Software affects the “penumbra” even
though they need not be directly using the software themselves.
For example, a medical technician uses software to control an
MRI machine, but the MRI machine and its results most directly
affect the person getting scanned. The “good” qualities of
software are particularly important for the penumbra. The effects
of unreliable software may fall on this group even more than
others, and the cost and time factors do not affect them as
directly.
Although software engineers are aware of these groups and
competing interests, they may be less aware of ethical principles
that can assist them in developing a reasoned, prudent
investigation of the tradeoffs. For example, Kenneth Alpern has
articulated an important principle in his article “Moral
Responsibility for Engineers”: because developers are in a
position to cause greater harm because of their technical
expertise, they must exercise greater care to avoid doing so [3].
This principle requires an emphasis on “good” over “fast/cheap”,
and supports reliability. In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls states:
justice requires special consideration for the least advantaged
[20]. In considering the stakeholders in software reliability
questions, the penumbra is often the least advantaged.

We think this analysis of professional relationships is useful in
discussing how software reliability fares in the good/fast/cheaptradeoff. In the following subsections, we examine three
particular contexts that have different constraints, constraints that
affect the engineering balancing act. The three contexts we will
examine are commercial, off-the-shelf software (COTSS);
custom-built software (CBS); and open source software (OSS). As
we shall see, the context of the software helps establish which of
Johnson’s computing professional relationship models is most
likely to surface as the tradeoffs are decided.

2.1 Context: Commercial Off-The-Shelf
Software

We should point out that an emphasis of “good” does not require
that “fast” or “cheap” be ignored. Software developers have
responsibilities to their employers that include developing
software efficiently and enhancing the company’s profitability.
Clearly, “good” can be over-emphasized in a way that is counterproductive; a piece of software that is perpetually in testing will
never reach the market, will never deliver functionality to users,
and will never deliver benefits to the penumbra. A company that
doesn’t deliver any functionality (or always delivers after its
competition) will go bankrupt. The engineer’s dilemma is not
about choosing one or two aspects; rather, it is about weighing
and balancing. The ethical principles that we discuss here
encourage a particular emphasis in that balancing act, not the
exclusion of any aspect.

Those negotiating good/fast/cheap-tradeoffs for COTSS bring a
myriad of concerns to the table, including marketing data,
corporate economic data, legal, and development time projections
for a particular project. Thus, there are many influences on the
ultimate balance among “good/fast/cheap” and the individual
software developer may have little control in the ultimate decision
of how good the software will be. Quite likely, the decisions
about fast and cheap will establish a maximum value for the
goodness of the software.
The importance of a COTSS developer pursuing raising “good” is
influenced by which of the two broad types of COTSS is being
developed: stand-alone applications or components that are to be
incorporated by developers into larger projects. An important
example of stand-along COTSS is shrink-wrapped software that is
mass marketed.

The idea that developers are obliged to consider users and the
penumbra in their technical decisions is explicit in ethics codes
relevant to software developers. For example, the Software
Engineering Code of Ethics and Professional Practice, adopted by
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A COTSS developer negotiating good/fast/cheap-tradeoffs for a
shrink-wrapped application is writing for a different user than a
developer writing a component for a larger system. On the one
hand, the consumer who buys and uses shrink-wrapped software
is likely to be less sophisticated about computing than someone
buying a component for integration into a larger system.
Ethically, this lack of expertise requires an increased burden of
care on the COTSS developer; a less sophisticated user is at a
power disadvantage. On the other hand, a COTSS consumer who
integrates a component into a larger program does not exhibit this
same power disadvantage. However, when a COTSS component
is integrated into new applications, the number of people affected
by the reliability of the original COTSS component is greatly
magnified. This increased distribution of the original work also
imposes an ethical burden on the COTSS component developer.

consumers and developers). Since the employer may be focused
on “fast/cheap” for obvious reasons, the public good requires that
the professional software engineer act responsibly. A particularly
poignant contradiction here is that an employer’s focus on
“fast/cheap” burdens the software engineer with identifying the
penumbra and the threats to them—reducing the amount of time
available for actual software development. This shift in priorities
to the penumbra may disadvantage the developer in the eyes of
the company.

Intended use is an important ethical consideration for software
development. It seems sensible that the good/cheap/fast-tradeoffs
will be different for software that monitors a nuclear power plant
than for software used to play a distributed Internet game. For
shrink-wrapped COTSS applications, this type of distinction can
be readily apparent during development. However, developers
working on COTSS components may have less knowledge about
where their component will be used. The same component could
be used in a computer game and in a missile guidance system.
This ambiguity about the ultimate fate of software being
developed is also true for developers in large organizations; they
receive specific assignments on projects about which they know
very little.

Assuming that the customer is well informed during negotiations
for custom-built software, these negotiations afford him/her
explicit power in helping to decide the good/fast/cheap-tradeoff.
If the contract is fixed cost, the informed customer knows that the
developer has an automatic incentive to emphasize “fast/cheap”.
If instead the customer makes explicit requirements for reliability
and other quality characteristics, then the customer can expect the
developer to emphasize “good” more consistently.

2.2 Context: Custom Built Software
In COTSS, a developer is often in a paternalistic relationship with
consumers. In custom-built software (CBS), contracts and other
agreements are more likely to result in an agency relationship: the
developer does what the user requests.

In some CBS, the ideal of a fiduciary relationship may develop.
When the contract negotiations and the subsequent development
include close cooperation between developers and customers,
trust can become an integral part of the process. In this context,
the responsibility for the penumbra falls on both. The customer
establishes the maximum good he/she is willing to pay or wait
for, while the developer establishes the minimum good he/she can
reasonably to deliver.

Making responsible good/cheap/fast-tradeoffs with limited
information about the eventual use of software is a difficult
challenge. A useful approach to this problem is the idea of
“informed consent” for software [16]. In order to make informed
consent possible with software, the developer must give the
COTSS consumer information about the good/cheap/fast-tradeoffs
inherent in the COTSS application or component. This
information should be understandable by the expected audience
(an audience of greater technical sophistication in the case of
components than in the case of shrink-wrapped applications) and
available before the consumer decides to buy. (Note that detailed
information on the outside of a shrink-wrapped application’s box
would fit this requirement, but that information inside the box
would not.)

The methodologies grouped under the phrase “agile methods” are
often cited as being aimed at producing active cooperation
between users and developers. The “Manifesto for Agile Software
Development” advocates “customer collaboration over contract
negotiation” and its principles include: “Business people and
developers must work together daily throughout the project” [1].
Whether all agile methods approach these ideals is unclear; what
is clear is that the Agile Manifesto advocates them. It seems that
CBS, rather than COTSS, is more likely to afford a developer the
opportunity for the kind of close cooperation envisioned by the
Manifesto and a chance to emphasize reliability.

While the COTSS company often has a paternalistic relationship
with COTSS consumers, the individual developer working for
that company may not be in a strong position to influence that
relationship. When a developer does not (and sometimes cannot)
know who the consumers are, the developer must make decisions
without consulting actual users. Although the developer can take
seriously the interests of the users and penumbra, COTSS is a
context in which decision-making resides primarily with the
company, especially in shrink-wrapped standalone applications.

2.3 Context: Open Source Software
Two strong traditions exist within the open source community.
One is GNU’s “free software definition” [7] and the other is
exemplified by the “open source definition” from OSI [18]. For
this paper we are interested in software where the source code is
available to every user and, thus, we will include both these
traditions under the banner of OSS. For other purposes, the
distinctions between these different alternatives and their
traditional commercial software counterparts can be important,
but they are not important to this paper.

A major ethical concern with paternalistic relationships is that the
party making decisions (typically management) may not
adequately protect the parties who live with those decisions (the

263

Developers are not “using” consumers to get their money. Users
are not trying to negotiate an unfair deal for software. Instead,
both developers and consumers in OSS are cooperating freely in
the OSS project.

COTSS and CBS both establish a strong distinction between
developers and consumers. An interesting aspect of OSS is that
this distinction can be less pronounced, suggesting that both the
good/fast/cheap-tradeoff and the paternalistic/agency/fiduciarymodel have to be looked at differently. Since the first users of
OSS are often the OSS developers themselves, the
professional/client labels seem less appropriate than they were for
COTSS and CBS. In spite of these complications, we still think
“good/fast/cheap” and “paternalistic/agency/fiduciary” are worth
examining for OSS.

Software reliability in OSS can be a motivation for becoming
involved both as a developer (who can contribute to the
development effort to increase reliability) and as a user (who
seeks a particular good/fast/cheap-tradeoff available in the
particular OSS project). The success of most OSS projects is not
judged typically by profits (although some companies do make
profits with OSS); the success is judged chiefly by how many
people use the software. By this measure, some OSS projects are
wildly successful.

Because a developer or group of developers runs a typical OSS
project and is responsible for making decisions about the design
of the software and the quality of the code that they will accept
into the code base, they are ultimately responsible for the
penumbra. In addition, their decisions about “good” directly
influence the life of the software project. Since the initial users
are the developers, they may be more tolerant of glitches and
quirks (bugs) than is acceptable for the penumbra. If the
reliability is not high enough, the project will likely terminate
quickly because without any marketing money behind the project,
it will not develop the strong user support it takes to make an OSS
project successful. Thus, at least the interests of the users, if not
the penumbra, are closely tied to the interests of the developers.

In the other contexts we have described, software developers and
others in the corporate structure share the burden of care for users
and the penumbra. In the OSS context, that responsibility falls
entirely upon the software developers. As OSS increases its
market share, OSS developers will be increasingly obligated to
consider their responsibilities to the people who use and are
affected by OSS. While it is true that OSS users participate freely,
it is not sufficient for OSS developers to point to the low price
and claim “you get what you pay for” if the software is unreliable.
The ethical principle of consideration of the public good is clear:
OSS developers have professional responsibilities, even though
they are different from traditional “professionals” in how their
work is rewarded. (OSS developers are often working for
intellectual challenge and prestige among programming peers.)

Much OSS is available for free downloads, and even when OSS is
sold, it tends to be inexpensive. The initial price of OSS is almost
always “cheap” compared to commercial alternatives. Even
though the initial cost may be free, there are few assurances about
the cost as problems arise. The user of OSS gives up the certainty
of a fixed cost with a maintenance cost that is unknown at the
outset. In addition, there are those who think that the low initial
price of OSS indicates problems with quality. Some contend that
the distributed nature of OSS development results in no central
entity that can answer maintenance questions quickly and
authoritatively; but OSS advocates counter that the distributed
nature of OSS quality improvement has an advantage over
commercial software because so many people are involved that
“all bugs are shallow” [21]. Furthermore, the user/developer
community determines the urgency of fixing a particular bug.

OSS developers have in some sense a built-in “informed consent”
advantage: by definition, OSS gives users the option of examining
the source code of the application. Although the source code may
not be understandable to many OSS users, this transparency of
code (rare in commercial projects) is a fundamentally open stance
that encourages a trust relationship between developers and users.
As with Agile Methods, OSS literature advocates a level of
cooperation and “community” for OSS participants that is not
encouraged or observed in, for example, users of shrink-wrapped
commercial applications.

2.4 Conclusions about the Three Contexts

From a developer’s perspective, the notion of “fast” is not as
meaningful in OSS where there is little concern about market
pressure, financing and marketing campaigns. There is an
opportunity for a project maintainer to forgo releasing the project
as an official release (beta-releases are regularly made available
as part of the process) until the maintainer is satisfied that the
minimum good threshold has been met. Thus, OSS is not
scheduled in the same way commercial products are scheduled.
The development of OSS is dictated by a large group of
developers, making it more difficult for an OSS customer (or
participant) to predict or change the pace of the OSS version
development. Of course, in OSS you can make your own
customized version of a particular OSS application without fear of
violating a licensing agreement.

COTSS, CBS, and OSS share some characteristics. No one can
make perfect software; developers in all three contexts have to
negotiate the good/fast/cheap-tradeoffs inherent in software
development. All developers have professional responsibilities to
the users and the penumbra. Reliability is an important
characteristic in all three contexts. Particularly unreliable software
is unwelcome in all contexts, and particularly reliable software is
likely to be rewarded.
Our analysis has shown that developers in a COTSS environment
have the least autonomy in raising the standard for reliability and
that their best opportunities for doing so come early in the
development process. When the concerns of the penumbra are
raised at the beginning of a project, those concerns have the best
chance of being addressed. Indeed, an even better time may be
even earlier in the process as the developer is contemplating

When developers and users of OSS neither get nor give payment,
coercive financial self-interest is no longer a major concern.
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previously published work: Grodzinsky, FS, Miller, K, Wolf, MJ,
(2005) Influences on and Incentives for Increasing Software
Reliability, forthcoming in Journal of Information,
Communication and Ethics in Society.

employment with the company. Does the company have a good
track record of responsibility to the penumbra? Developers in a
CBS environment, especially one that employs Agile
Methodologies, have the opportunity to regularly renegotiate the
good/fast/cheap-tradeoff with the user, with the developer having
a possibly equal say in the reliability decisions. Finally, OSS
developers have extensive autonomy in identifying what is “good
enough” for their project.
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